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1. Introduction: The EU’s external border controls debate 
In the first week of October 2013, a boat carrying people from the southern shores of the 
Mediterranean towards the Italian island of Lampedusa foundered and sank, resulting in the 
deaths of about 300 persons and the rescue of about 160. Responses from different actors 
within the EU have varied, although all have expressed sadness and condolences to those 
who lost loved ones in the disaster. UNHCR, the UN’s refugee agency, immediately called 
for swift action from Italy to improve reception conditions for those arriving by sea. The 
focus was specifically on the conditions under which people, including asylum-seekers, are 
received in the country.1 
Pope Francis said it was a "day of tears" and denounced the "savage" system that drives people 
to leave their homes for a better life, yet does not care when they die in the process.2 
Focusing on the ethics of the international system which results in deaths, the Pope perhaps 
highlighted one of the aspects of deaths in the Mediterranean which is least explored – why 
do the captains of the fishing boats and other vessels in Mediterranean not rescue these 
people? This sea is among the most heavily used for shipping and fishing, it is full of boats 
which could respond to distress signals, why do they not? This was a central issue in the 
Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly’s Strik 2012 Report on the responsibility to 
rescue, which focused on the failure to rescue people in a distressed small boat in the 
Mediterranean just before military action in Libya.3  
                                                   
1  See news stories on the UNHCR websites (http://www.unhcr.org/52556a469.html and 
http://www.unhcr.org/5257d5599.html). 
2 “Lampedusa Disaster: Bad Weather Delays Rescue Operation as hopes face for victims of migrant boat tragedy 
off Italian island”, The Independent, 4 October 2013 (http://www.independent.co.uk/).  
3 Strik, T. (2012), Lives lost in the Mediterranean Sea: Who is responsible, Report from the Committee on Migration, 
Refugees and Displaced Persons, Doc 12895 (2012). For an analysis refer to L. den Hertog (2012), Two Boats in the 
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One of the factors in this discussion that receives less attention is the role of current EU anti-
smuggling and trafficking legislation4 and the way it has been transposed into national law 
by EU Member States, which often creates a presumption that a captain is committing the 
offence of smuggling or trafficking if he or she brings unauthorized people into harbours. 
The consequence is criminal prosecution and confiscation of the individual’s boat. 5 While 
captains who prove that they were acting from humanitarian motives to rescue people may 
eventually be acquitted and their boats released, the process usually takes many years 
during which their families have no source of income and the main bread winner may be in 
pre-trial detention.6  
The EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström said that "In the aftermath of the 
Lampedusa tragedy we heard solidarity expressions from all EU countries, but these will remain only 
empty words if they are not followed by concrete actions. I also call on North African countries, in 
particular Libya, to fight more effectively the criminals who put these people in unseaworthy vessels 
and organise these journeys of death.” 7  Malmström’s statement could be interpreted as 
displacing the responsibility on North African governments to prevent people leaving their 
shores for the EU. This would however create a certain tension with the human right 
expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention of 
Human Rights8 that everyone has the right to leave the country in which he or she may be. 
In the same context, she claimed at an EU meeting in Luxembourg on 8 October 2013 that 
Frontex,9 the EU’s external border agency, needs greater funding. The annual Frontex budget 
has apparently decreased from €118 million in 2011 to €85 million this year. While 
Malmström stressed the need for rescue and assistance of boats, the deployment of border 
guards for this purpose follows a very specific agenda – ensuring that ‘rescue and assistance’ 
mean that people are returned to North African states from which they departed rather than 
be allowed to enter and seek refuge in the EU. The central focus seems to be one on the 
management and surveillance of the EU’s external borders, particularly in the 
Mediterranean. 
The sense of urgency about the state of affairs in the Mediterranean culminated in the 
adoption of the European Council Conclusions of 24 and 25 October 2013, which underlined 
the importance of addressing the “root causes of migration flows by enhancing cooperation with 
the countries of origin and transit, including through appropriate EU development support and 
effective return policy”.10 The Conclusions did however not adopt any concrete EU policy 
                                                                                                                                                               
Mediterranean and their Unfortunate Encounters with Europe’s Policies towards People on the Move, CEPS Liberty and 
Security Series, Brussels. 
4  See the relevant EU legal instruments here http://ec.europa.eu/anti-
trafficking/Legislation+and+Case+Law/EU+Legislation/Criminal+Law/  
5 Further, according to the Guardian Weekly 11 – 17 October 2013, in August 2013 the Italian authorities ordered 
two commercial ships to rescue a migrant boat and then demanded that captains transport the migrants back to 
Libya (where none of them wanted to go and indeed from where they were in flight). One can well imagine the 
dilemma of the captains faced with a boat load of desperate people terrified of being returned to Libya. The result 
is that the Italian authorities have effectively made their own services and those of FONTEX the only ones willing 
to take on rescue at sea of people in small boats. And, of course their own services are too limited. 
6 Tugba Basaran is one of the few researchers seriously examining this deterrence effect on humanitarianism. See 
presentation REPI, ULB, 27 April 2013. Also see The Saved and The Drowned: Governing Indifference Towards Rescue 
research paper available from the author. Refer also to E. Guild and P. Minderhoud (2006), Immigration And 
Criminal Law in the European Union: The Legal Measures and Social Consequences of Criminal Law in Member States on 
Trafficking and Smuggling in Human Rights. Vol. 9., Martinus Nijhoff Publishers: Leiden. 
7 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-883_en.htm 
8 Protocol 4 Article 2(2). 
9 Refer to http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-864_en.htm 
10 European Council Conclusions, 24/25 October 2013, Brussels, EUCO 169/13, 25 October 2013. 
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action on these matters,11 with the exception of the establishment of Task Force for the 
Mediterranean (TFM) led by the Directorate General for Home Affairs of the European 
Commission.12   Both the Council Conclusions and some of the lines of action currently 
assessed by the TFM13 demonstrate that the EU institutions are determinedly looking at the 
states in North Africa and asking why they do not act as ‘substitute border guards’ for the 
EU and prevent people leaving their shores. The Council announced that it will return to 
asylum and migration issues “in a broader and longer-term perspective” in June 2014, at which 
time “strategic guidelines for further legislative and operational planning in the area of freedom, 
security and justice” are expected to be defined.14  
The political chaos in Libya since the toppling the regime of Muammar Qaddafi by France 
and the UK has been reported to be one of the main reasons why boats are sailing. While 
Italy has a new arrangement with Tunisia to send its nationals back, it has none with Libya. 
The lack of a readmission agreement between the EU and Libya may not be so surprising 
bearing in mind the current state of affairs in Libya. The news outlet, the Daily Beast, 
reported on 11 September 2013 that on 19 August 2013, a group of gunmen attacked a 
convoy carrying the EU ambassador to Libya.15 The assault outside the Corinthia Hotel in 
central Tripoli was not far from Prime Minister Ali Zidan’s main office. The gunmen robbed 
the EU delegation at gunpoint before shooting at passing cars. Policemen outside the hotel 
did not dare intervene, according to EU diplomats. It is not clear who was part of the EU 
delegation or what they were doing in Libya. Accounts from people arriving in the EU via 
Libya indicate that between criminal gangs who carry out kidnapping and extortion and 
Libyan border officials there seems to be very little difference.16 At the end of May 2013 the 
Council authorised the opening of negotiations with Libya for an agreement on the status of 
the EU integrated border management assistance mission in Libya (EUBAM Libya)17 to be 
carried out in accordance with Libyan needs assessment on border management which the 
EU undertook in 2012 and allocated a budget of €30.3 million for the first 12 months.18 
Similar to Malmström’s position, the above-mentioned October European Council 
Conclusions called for the reinforcement of Frontex activities in the Mediterranean and the 
south-eastern borders of the EU, as well as the swift implementation by EU Member States of 
                                                   
11As the European Voice rightly noted, calls alluding to the need to re-think “the European Union's migration and 
asylum policy fell on deaf ears”. EU Leaders Postpone Migration Talks, 25.10.2013 
(https://www.europeanvoice.com/article/2013/october/eu-leaders-postpone-migration-talks/78564.aspx). 
12 The TFM has a dual mission: one operational (identify short-term measures to be implemented) and another 
conceptual (on future policy developments in the medium-term). The European Council invited the TFM to 
“identify -based on the principles of prevention, protection and solidarity - priority actions for a more efficient short term use 
of European policies and tools. The Commission will report to the Council at its meeting of 5-6 December 2013 on the work 
of the Task Force with a view of taking operational decisions. The Presidency will report to the European Council in 
December.” See paragraph 48 of the Conclusions. It is to be noted the absence of any express reference to the role 
or participation of the European Parliament in this Task Force. 
13 The TFM lines of action include for instance strengthening border surveillance operations, building ‘capacity’ in 
third countries on migration management and border controls and specific initiatives in cooperation with third 
countries (such as Libya), such as the setting up of a Seahorse Mediterranean network between Libya and the 
Mediterranean Member States by 2015 or the installation of radar systems on North African states’ coasts. 
14 For a critical assessment of the post-Stockholm Programme agenda refer to S. Carrera and E. Guild (2012), Does 
the Stockholm Programme Matters? The Struggles over Ownership of AFSJ Multiannual Programming, Liberty and 
Security in Europe Series, CEPS, Brussels. 
15 See http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/09/11/the-travesty-of-benghazi.html 
16  See for instance Amnesty International Report 
(http://www.amnesty.eu/content/assets/S_O_S_Europe_Report_Web_02.pdf). 
17 Press Release, Council meeting on Foreign Affairs 27-28 May 2013, Document number 9977/13. 
18 Press Release, Council, 22 May 2013 Document number 9478/13. 
4 | GUILD & CARRERA 
 
the new European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR), 19  which according to the 
Conclusions “will be crucial to help detecting vessels and illegal entries, contributing to protecting 
and saving lives at the EU's external borders.” EUROSUR envisages the use of a set of 
surveillance tools (such as satellite tracking systems and sensors mounted on any vessel, 
vehicle or other craft, such as drones) in order to seek improving the ‘situational awareness’ 
and ‘reaction capability’ of Frontex and member states authorities in the prevention of 
irregular migration (unauthorized border crossings) and cross-border crime at the EU’s 
common external land and maritime borders. According to the Guardian, 3 October 2013 
“European policymakers claim the (EUROSUR) technology will make a serious contribution to 
saving migrant lives on the sea, but sceptics say that the project is still primarily focused on 
preventing migrants reaching Europe at all, and legislation needs to be redrafted to put humanitarian 
concerns at the forefront of Eurosur's operations.”20 It is indeed not clear the actual ways in 
which EUROSUR will effectively contribute in the protection of migrants and asylum 
seekers, and their human rights, at sea.21  
In the debates on the Mediterranean and human mobility, one of the issues which arise 
regularly is that of technologies. Is there a technological fix to the movement of people 
across the Mediterranean from the South to the North (there is never any concern about 
the thousands of tourists, as they are called, who travel daily from the North shore of the 
Mediterranean to the southern shores in ferries)?  
This Essay takes a step back from the immediacy of the October 2013 events. It examines the 
issue of EU border controls from the perspectives of the technologies, new and old. There 
has been a rich academic research on border controls and analysis of their meanings and 
effects.22 Here we will build on this body of work which crosses a variety of scholarly 
disciplines to understand what is happening to border controls on the movement of persons 
in the EU and why the results are so deadly. The technologies of control and surveillance 
available for external border controls in the EU are increasing in number and variety. The 
claims made about them often that in some specific ways they are ‘smarter’ than other 
technologies, abound. What has been less examined is what we can deduce about new and 
old border control technologies from the information and statistical data which are 
available on movements of people into and out of the EU. Most of the information we have 
about this comes directly from Frontex, which publishes both quarterly reports on EU border 
                                                   
19 Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council establishing the European Border Surveillance System 
(EUROSUR), 22 October 2013 (http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/13/pe00/pe00056-re02.en13.pdf). 
20  Mediterranean migrant deaths: a litany of largely avoidable loss, The Guardian, 3 October 2013, 
(http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/03/mediterranean-migrant-deaths-avoidable-loss). 
21  J. Jeandesboz (2008), Reinforcing the Surveillance of EU Borders: The Future Development of FRONTEX and 
EUROSUR, Challenge Paper, CEPS, Brussels. 
22 Bigo and colleagues have carried out a recent and extremely important study on the new technologies of border 
controls (Bigo, Didier, et al. "Justice and Home Affairs Databases and a Smart Borders System at EU External 
Borders." (2012)); We published a multidisciplinary analysis of EU border controls in 2013 (Bigo, Didier, Sergio 
Carrera, and Elspeth Guild, eds. Foreigners, Refugees Or Minorities?: Rethinking People in the Context of Border 
Controls and Visas. Ashgate Publishing, 2013). Baldaccini has examined from a legal perspective exactly the issue 
of FRONTEX operations in the Mediterranean. (Baldaccini, Anneliese. "Extraterritorial border controls in the EU: 
The role of FRONTEX in operations at sea." Extraterritorial Immigration Control: Legal Challenges, Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers (2010): 229-255); Zaiotti published a fascinating study on the cultures of EU border controls 
which looks at the sociology of these controls (Zaiotti, Ruben. Cultures of border control: Schengen and the evolution 
of European frontiers. University of Chicago Press, 2011); Vaughn-Williams takes the discussion into the field of 
international relations in his 2009 book on the theory of border controls (Vaughan-Williams, Nick, ed. Border 
politics. Edinburgh University Press, 2009). 
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controls with a wealth of information on the current situation and annual reports on border 
controls.23  
The Essay opens with an overview of what actually happens at the EU’s external borders 
(section 2). It then moves on to assess the old and new set of border control technologies that 
are deployed at the EU borders, and how new technologies such as those based on 
automated controls and biometrics, transform the classical principles of European border 
checks (section 3). Section 4 covers the main reasons why people are refused admission at the 
EU’s external borders and the extent to which new border and surveillance technologies 
would assist in addressing the mobility challenges in the Mediterranean. Conclusions are 
finally offered on the articulation between the facts of EU border controls on persons and the 
claims and proposals for new technologies which are emerging from EU institutions. A 
fundamental question is here raised: What kind of borders should the EU have? (section 5). 
2. What happens at the EU’s external borders? The scale dilemma 
There is much uncertainty about how many people enter the EU across its external 
borders each year. The EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency (FRA) states that the number, 
including EU citizens and third country nationals comes to about 300 million per year.24 The 
latest Frontex Risk Analysis (FRAN)25 puts the figure at about 125 million people entering 
the EU each year, which figure includes third country nationals as well as EU citizens. These 
figures are somewhat surprising not only because they do not correspond very well but also 
in light of the single formal study on exit and entries at the external borders of the EU which 
was carried out by the Council in 2009.  
The Council found that between 31 August and 6 September 2009 the total number of entries 
and exits registered during that one week at all the external borders of the European Union 
was: a total of 12,907,581 of which EU nationals constituted 9,312,665. 26  Third country 
nationals (non visa) accounted for 2,130,256 entries and exits while visa third country 
nationals represented 1,464,660 entries and exits. Making the general assumption that as 
many people entered as exited (which is flawed of course but at least permits the division of 
the overall figures by half) the total number of third country nationals who might have 
entered the EU during that one week in September 2009 was 1,797,458. If one multiplies this 
number (rounded up to 1.8 million) by the number of weeks in a year (52) the figure would 
be 93.6 million entries per year. This is a very rough estimate for many reasons,27 but at least 
                                                   
23 The information included in this article comes primarily from the FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis 2013 
(http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2013.pdf).  
24  http://fra.europa.eu/en/project/2011/treatment-third-country-nationals-eus-external-borders-surveying-
border-checks-selected 
25  Frontex, FRAN Quarterly, Quarter 2, April-June 2013, Warsaw: Poland 
(http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q2_2013.pdf). 
26  Council Document 13267/09, 22 September 2009. The exercise took place on the initiative by the Czech 
Presidency of the EU (during the first half of 2009), which called for an exercise on data collection on entries and 
exists at the external borders of the Member States between the period of one week – i.e. 31 August and 6 
September 2009. The aim was to gather comparable statistics on entries and exits of different categories of 
travellers (EU citizens and TCNs) at different types of external borders (air, sea and land) and at all border 
crossing points at the external borders. 
27 Amongst others, the period of time during which the Czech Presidency exercise took place constituted only one 
week and coincided with the end of the summer season (end of August/beginning of September), something 
which might have determined that some of the results (e.g. those of Spain) are higher than in an annual average. 
Second, some of the data provided is based on the entries of TCNs who are required a ‘visa’. The Council 
document did not specify the kind of visas that were taken into consideration by the national authorities (i.e. 
whether they only included short-term Schengen visas and/or national (long-term) visas, and the extent to which 
Schengen transit or multiple-entry visas were also included in the exercise). The kind of visas however has 
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it represents a point of departure regarding the numbers of third country nationals who 
enter the EU each year based on the only formal information collected on behalf of the 
Council from the relevant national institutions responsible for border controls.  
During that one week period, according to the Council document entries and exits of all 
nationals at EU sea borders accounted for 1,101,677. Land borders comprised 5,035,709 of the 
total entries and exits and air borders constituted the remaining 6,770,195 entries and exits. If 
once again one simply chops the numbers in half to get some idea of the numbers of entries 
of all people, EU citizens and third country nationals, the entries at sea borders might 
account for about 500,000 per week. Assuming that within a range of a few thousand 
persons, these figures are probably fairly representative, the arrival of a few hundred 
people across the Mediterranean seems rather small.  
Indeed, according to Frontex, the total number of people who were found crossing into the 
EU via sea borders (all of them not in the Mediterranean) irregularly in 2012 amounted to 
23,254. The precision of the number indicates that Frontex must be fairly confident about the 
accuracy of the figure. According to UNHCR estimates, more than 1,500 people drowned or 
went missing while attempting to cross the Mediterranean to reach Europe in 2011.28 The 
non-governmental organization, Fortress Europe, estimates that between 1988 and 2013 
approximately 19,142 persons have died trying to entry the EU (though this figure includes 
all borders, land, sea and air).29  
What one is encountering here is a problem of scale (the scale dilemma). The fact that the 
number of people entering and leaving the EU in authorized manners is so large and the 
number of people crossing into the EU via sea borders in the Mediterranean is 
comparative so small is hard to take in the distance. Further, the difference of scale is so 
large that it makes the panic presented in some parts of the press and political discourses 
regarding the numbers of people arriving on the little boats in the Mediterranean seem very 
strange indeed. Christoper Chope MP of the Council of Europe’s Committee on Migration is 
reported in the Guardian Weekly 11 – 1 7 October 2013 in reaction to the problem of the 
failure to rescue people in the Mediterranean “if traffickers think they can smuggle people in with 
impunity, that’s the incentive for smuggling to increase.” If the EU has no trouble admitting 
around 500,000 people a week through its sea borders, how can less than +/- 25,000 a year 
constitute such a big policy challenge? 
The total population of the EU is slightly over 508 million people. Of this population 6.8% 
are third country nationals according to the EU’s statistical agency, EUROSTAT.30 In 2012, 
according to Frontex, 115,305 people were refused admission to the EU at its external 
borders. Only third country nationals can be refused admission at the EU’s external borders, 
EU citizens have a right to enter the EU though entry can be limited to their Member State of 
underlying citizenship. Assuming that about 93.6 million third country nationals enter the 
EU each year this means that the percentage of people refused entry at the external border is 
0.12% of those who present themselves to border guards. Again according to Frontex, in 
2012, 73,437 persons were detected attempting to cross the EU’s external borders other than 
at designated entry points. This is about 0.08% of the probable total number of people who 
are admitted to the EU at its external borders per year (once again bearing in mind the 
rough nature of the gross figure). Scale is also here an outstanding issue. 
                                                                                                                                                               
implications concerning potential double-counting of entries and exists in the total numbers which were 
provided. 
28 See UNHCR website (http://www.unhcr.org/4f27e01f9.html). 
29 See Fortress Europe website (http://fortresseurope.blogspot.it/p/la-fortezza.html). 
30  http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/EU_citizenship_-_statistics_on_cross-
border_activities  
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3. Changing technologies at the EU external borders: Passports, visas and 
biometric databases 
There are a variety of border control technologies which are deployed at the EU external 
borders. The most traditional of these technologies is a manual check of the passport 
presented by an individual to a border guard at a designated border crossing point and the 
manual stamping of that passport by a border guard with an entry stamp which includes the 
date of entry. All persons entering the EU at an external border crossing point are obliged by 
EU law to present themselves to a border guard for this examination.31 If they are on the so-
called Schengen visa black list,32 then a condition of entry is that they have already received a 
Schengen visa or the equivalent before they arrive.  
‘Non-visa third country nationals’ arriving at the EU’s external border and seeking entry, 
according to the above-mentioned one week’s count of third country nationals’ entries and 
exits, account for 68.5% of all third country nationals entering the EU. This is interesting as 
more than 100 countries are on the EU’s visa black list which account for about 80% of the 
non-EU world’s population, according to Frontex. Non visa nationals do not go through any 
other identity control at the EU’s external borders than this manual check of their documents 
unless the border guards have reason to carry out a more in depth investigation. Thus non-
visa nationals are those who are subject only to the oldest and most traditional border 
controls, which depend on the person’s country of nationality having issued him or her a 
passport which is accepted at the EU border as sufficient for entry.  
However, these non-visa nationals may soon find themselves the objects of a new EU border 
technology system in the form of a Registered Traveller Programme (RTP), which forms 
part of the so-called ‘EU smart borders package’.33 The RTP would aim at speeding up 
border-crossing for pre-vetted or ‘bona fide’ travellers based on automated identity checks 
and border-crossing gates. The Commission launched a proposal for the creation of such a 
system in 201334 the objective of which is to change the fundamental classical principle of 
European border checks from one in which all nationals of a state are treated equally to what 
the Commission delicately calls a ‘person-centric’ or driven approach which means that 
citizenship is no longer the organizing principle of the border control, rather it is the profile 
of the individual. The system would also feed on the suspicion that there is a potential 
‘illegal migrant’ or ‘overstayer’ in every non-EU traveller coming to Europe. The European 
Commission has described the RTP as follows: 
In practice the RTP would work at the border the following way: A registered traveller would 
be issued a token in the form of a machine-readable card containing only a unique identifier 
(i.e. application number), which is swiped on arrival and departure at the border using an 
automated gate. The gate would read the token and the travel document (and visa sticker 
number, if applicable) and the fingerprints of the travellers, which would be compared to the 
ones stored in the Central Repository and other databases, including the Visa Information 
System (VIS) for visa holders. If all checks are successful, the traveller is able to pass through 
the automated gate. In case of any issue, the traveller would be assisted by a border guard.35 
                                                   
31 Article 7, Schengen Borders Code, Regulation 562/2006. 
32 Regulation No 539/2001. 
33  See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1234_en.htm For an assessment of the original 2008 
Commission Communication see Guild, E., S. Carrera and F. Geyer 2008. The Commission’s New Border Package: 
Does it take us one step closer to cyber-fortress Europe?. Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS. 
34  European Commission. 2013. Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Registered Traveller Programme, 
COM(2013) 97 final, Brussels. 
35 COM(2013)97, p. 3.  
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So any non-visa third country national who would wish to enjoy a facilitated entry at the 
EU’s external borders would have to provide a variety of personal data, including 
fingerprints which will be held either in the VIS (see below regarding visa nationals) or a 
new database entitled the Central Repository and these fingerprints together with the 
passport would constitute essential elements of entry at the external border.  
Databases of biometric information about individuals are one of the hallmarks of new 
border technologies. There is a substantial appetite for these databases in EU policies and 
laws regarding third country nationals which we explain further below. What is central, 
however, to the use of biometric databases in external border controls of the EU is that they 
partially replace the passport as the document which determines the identity of the 
individual. Instead of the individual’s legal identity being a matter of negotiation between 
that person and his or her state of citizenship through the issue of a passport to him or her, 
the EU database makes an alternative claim to identifying the individual. No matter what the 
passport of the individual may say, the EU database which contains the fingerprints of the 
individual enjoys an advantage – the capacity to tie the physical person with an inalienable 
part of his or her body – e.g. fingerprints.  
For instance, a person with dual nationality (US and Canadian) would register in the RTP 
with their fingerprints and their US passport. He or she would then travel to the EU on his or 
her valid Canadian passport. The EU database would check the person’s fingerprints in the 
automated entry and recognizes the person as a US citizen (not a Canadian one). The 
automated entry system would likely to be uncomfortable with the outcome, but the 
problem would likely be resolved so long as the person has both of his or her passports with 
him or her to show to a border guard sent to resolve the machine’s confusion. But what has 
happened in this practical example is that the knowledge of the database as to who the 
person is takes priority over the valid documentation which his or her country of 
citizenship has issued to him or her. 
For third county nationals on the mandatory visa list, the passport which their state issues to 
its citizens is not sufficient for travel to the EU. Those people must obtain a visa from an EU 
(Schengen member)36 consulate through which process the person must provide substantial 
personal information (including about income and resources) as well as biometric data 
including fingerprints (unless the person is under 12 years of age37 or physically unable to 
provide them)38 this data, including information from sponsors in the EU who may be EU 
citizens is stored in a new EU database, the Visa Information System (VIS)39 and is available 
to border guards and law enforcement authorities across the EU. Thus these third country 
nationals have a new identity created for them by the EU visa system. The place of the 
creation of that identity is while they are still in their country of origin. The value of that 
new EU controlled identity (which is valid for 59 months – after that the fingerprints need to 
                                                   
36 The Schengen countries which can issue Schengen visas valid for short stays of 3 months out of every six month 
period I the Schengen area are all EU Member States except: Bulgaria, Croatia, Ireland, Romania and the UK. But 
it includes the non-EU states of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland: Billet, Carole. "Les relations 
extérieures des agences ELSJ après le traité de Lisbonne." Colloque sur la dimension institutionnelle du volet externe de 
l'ELSJ. 2011. 
37  Though according to the European Commission, it is having a study carried out to determine whether 
fingerprints from children younger than 12 can be reliable for database purposes. COM(2013)442, pp 7-8. 
38 EU Visa Code, Regulation 810/2009 Article 13(7)(a) and (b). 
39  The VIS started operations in October 2011 in Schengen States’ consulates in North Africa and was 
progressively deployed in the Near East and the Gulf Region in 2012. Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 of 9 July 2008 
concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data between Member States on short-stay 
visas (VIS Regulation) as amended by Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of 13 July 2009. 
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be taken again)40 is that it creates a presumption either that the person is admissible to the 
EU (through any external border post) as a visitor for three months if a visa is issued, or a 
presumption against future issue of a visa if the application is refused. If a dual 
Turkish/Lebanese national applies again for a visa using the Lebanese passport after refusal 
of such a request using his or her Turkish passport, the fingerprint record in the VIS is 
supposed to reveal the unique identity of the person. 
Visas are not new even in the EU. 41 But their traditional role has been as a tool of foreign 
policy, a sanction against states between whom there is antagonism. Its development as an 
immigration control tool in the EU is a story which dates from about the mid 1980s.42 The 
importance of visas as a foreign affairs tool re-emerges with the creation of no-visa lists in 
the EU (and elsewhere) in particular following the Bosnian wars of the 1990s.43 The effects of 
visas on the phenomenon of death in the Mediterranean has been examined by de Haas.44 
According to his research the phenomenon of irregular boat migration “has existed ever since 
Spain and Italy introduced visa requirements for Moroccans, Algerians, Tunisians and other African 
nationals around 1991. This forced many people, who previously could migrate and circulate to 
Europe freely, to cross borders irregularly. Over the past decades, an increasing number of sub-
Saharan African migrants and refugees have joined North Africans in their efforts to cross the 
Mediterranean.”45 Before 1991 there was no such phenomenon and there were alternatives to 
irregular boat migration, most importantly, regular mobility. 
The linking of visas with biometric databases is a much newer development. In the EU it 
only begins with the creation of the VIS made possible by the adoption of a measure in 2004 
though the system only became operational on 11 October 2011.46 According to the European 
Commission the VIS consists of a central IT system and of a communication infrastructure 
that links this central system to national systems. VIS connects EU (Schengen) consulates in 
non-EU countries and all external border crossing points of Schengen States. It processes 
data and decisions relating to applications for short-stay visas to visit, or to transit through, 
the Schengen Area. The system can perform biometric matching, primarily of fingerprints, 
for identification and verification purposes. The Schengen visa itself carries the fingerprints 
of the individual to whom it is issued which fingerprints have been collected in the country 
of origin then stored in the VIS (now managed by the European Agency for the operational 
management of large-scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice (eu-LISA) 
based in Tallinn).47  
When the person arrives at the EU external border those fingerprints in the visa are checked 
against the VIS database to ensure that the person carrying the passport is the same person 
whose fingerprints were taken during the visa procedure. This checking process requires 
                                                   
40 EU Visa Code, Regulation 810/2009 Article 13(3). 
41 Wolff, Sarah, Nicole Wichmann, and Gregory Mounier (eds.) The External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, 
Routledge, 2013. 
42 Infantino, Federica, and Andrea Rea. "La mobilisation d'un savoir pratique local: attribution des visas Schengen 
au Consulat général de Belgique à Casablanca." Sociologies pratiques 1 (2012): 67-78; Hobolth, Mogens. "European 
visa cooperation: interest politics and regional imagined communities." LEQS Paper 34 (2011). 
43  See the EU External Action Service general comment 
(http://eeas.europa.eu/cfsp/sanctions/docs/index_en.pdf#2.3). 
44 Co-Director of the International Migration Institute (IMI) of the Department of International Development and 
the University of Oxford. 
45 Hein de Haas, 5 October 2013, Blogspot http://heindehaas.blogspot.fr/ . 
46  European Commission (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-
new/news/news/2011/20111011_en.htm). 
47  See EU-Lisa Activity Report (http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-
visas/agency/docs/activity-report-2012/eu-lisa_2012_activity_report_en.pdf). 
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fingerprint machines to be available at EU external border posts (which was not universally 
the case in 2013). The system was still being rolled in 2013 out by area of the world. The 
choice of where to start rolling out the system is perhaps an indication of where in the 
world the EU has not most concerns. The first region to which it was applied was North 
Africa. The second region where the collection and transmission of visa data to the VIS 
started for all visa applications was the Near East, with the exception of the occupied 
Palestinian territory due to the serious technical difficulties (it has now been designated the 
11th region). The third is the Gulf region.48 The next region rolled out was West Africa, 
Central Africa, East Africa, Southern Africa, South America, Central Asia, South East Asia.49 
The fourth and fifth regions, the rest of Africa, were rolled out in 2013.50 The Commission 
estimates that roughly 2.4 million visa applications were introduced in VIS In 2012. That is 
some 16% of total visa applications in that year. The objective of the VIS again according to 
the Commission is to tackle identity theft more effectively.51 
The effect of the VIS is the bringing into existence of a large database with extensive 
personal information and biometric data in the form of fingerprints which is available to 
consular officials, border guards and law enforcement agencies across the EU. But the 
biometric information is only about third country nationals who are on the mandatory visa 
list. The need for the VIS rests on the threat of identity threat. The need for the biometric 
information in the form of the fingerprints in order to combat identity theft in the crossing of 
the EU’s external borders needs to be examined in light of Frontex’s information on the 
incidence of identity theft. According to Frontex in 2013, 7,888 incidents of people using false 
or fraudulent documents were detected in the whole of the EU. Over half of these documents 
were detected at the air borders and just under a third were in respect of Albanian 
documents (2,110).52 Albanians are not required to have visa to enter the EU (so long as they 
have a new style biometric passport). Thus their fingerprints will not be included in the VIS.  
The next most important nationalities where false or fraudulent travel documents were used, 
in numbers, were Syrians (486 – most likely people seeking to escape the civil war using 
someone else’s passport), Moroccans (397) and Ukrainians (284). The three countries are all 
on the mandatory visa list. The numbers, however, are very low indeed. Considering the 
financial expenses of setting up the VIS and its operation, the intrusion into the private lives 
of third country nationals not least with the collection of biometric data in the form of 
fingerprints, this is a very dubious project. 2.4 million sets of fingerprints were entered into 
the VIS in 2012 and made available to all EU border and law enforcement agencies yet EU 
border guards only detected 7,888 cases of document fraud in that year and a third of those 
were in respect of people who do not need visas and so whose details are not in the VIS. In 
light of this information, it is difficult to claim that the VIS is a border control technology. 
Yet for the moment, the EU agencies make no other claim regarding the reason for the VIS’s 
existence. The country which accounts for the largest number of Schengen visa applications 
is Russia. The total number of Schengen visa applications in 2011 was over 13.5 million and 
Russians accounted for about 30% of those applications.53 Russian nationals also account for 
8.5% of refusal of entry at the EU’s external borders, coming third after Ukrainians (16%) and 
Albanians (10%) of the total number of refusals of entry. 
                                                   
48 Commission Decision 30 November 2009, C(2009)8542. 
49 Commission Decision 24 April 2012 C(2012)2505. 
50 Commission Implementing Decision 2013/122/EU of 7 March 2013. 
51 COM(2013)42 final. 
52  Frontex, FRAN Quarterly, Quarter 2, April-June 2013, Warsaw: Poland 
(http://www.frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q2_2013.pdf). 
53 FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis 2013. 
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4. Why are people refused admission at the EU’s external border? 
The arguments in respect of the technologies, both new and old, for EU border controls on 
persons are based on the officially purported objective that unwanted people who do not 
fulfil the requirements for entry into the EU should not be allowed to enter. The Schengen 
Borders Code (SBC)54 spells out at Article 5 the requirements which people must fulfil in 
order to enter the EU Schengen area. People must show that: 
a) they are in possession of a valid travel document or documents authorising them to cross 
the border; 
(b) they are in possession of a valid visa, if required except where they hold a valid residence 
permit; 
(c) they can justify the purpose and conditions of the intended stay, and they have sufficient 
means of subsistence, both for the duration of the intended stay and for the return to their 
country of origin or transit to a third country into which they are certain to be admitted, or are 
in a position to acquire such means lawfully; 
(d) they are not persons for whom an alert has been issued in the Schengen Information 
System (SIS) for the purposes of refusing entry; 
(e) they are not considered to be a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or 
the international relations of any of the Member States, in particular where no alert has been 
issued in Member States’ national data bases for the purposes of refusing entry on the same 
grounds. 
The Commission has proposed a new initiative: the creation of an electronic Entry-Exit 
System (EES) in order to have EU-wide record of entries and exits of travellers to and from 
the Schengen area and thus a reliable means for Member States to determine if a third-
country national has exceeded his/her right to stay.55 This will allow Member States to know 
whether the people who have actually been admitted to the EU in fact fulfilled the criteria of 
Article 5(1)(c) SBC (or not). But the EES will only be able to provide that information when 
the person leaves, so the record will be primarily historical. The Commission makes three 
main claims regarding the value of the proposed system. It will: 
 Calculate the authorised stay of each traveller; this includes at entry, in case of a 
traveller having visited the Schengen area frequently, to quickly and precisely 
calculate how many days there are left of the maximum of 90 days within 180 days; at 
exit, to verify that the traveller has respected the authorised stay; and within the 
territory, in relation to carrying out checks on third-country nationals to verify the 
legality of their stay;  
 Assist in the identification of any person who may not, or may no longer, fulfil the 
conditions for entry to, or stay on the territory of the Member States; this concerns 
notably persons who are found during checks within the territory not in possession 
of their travel documents or any other means of identification;  
                                                   
54 Regulation establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders 
(Schengen Borders Code), EC/562/2006, 15 March 2006, OJ L 105/1, 13.4.2006. The Code substituted the 
provisions regarding external borders as included in the Schengen Convention, the Common Border Manual, the 
Executive Committee Decision on external border control in airports, Council Regulation 790/2001, the Council 
Decision on border crossing sings as well as the Council Regulation on stamping of documents. 
55 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation establishing an Entry/Exit System (EES) to register entry and 
exit data of third country nationals crossing the external borders of the Member States of the European Union, 
COM(2013) 95 final, Brussels. 
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 To support the analysis of the entries and exits of third-country nationals; this 
includes notably getting a precise picture of travel flows at the external borders and 
the number of overstayers, .e.g. by nationality of travellers.56 
The Commission has proposed the allocation of €1.1 billion to develop the EES and the RTP 
Scheme outlined in the previous section of this Essay. The estimated costs have risen 
however to €1.3 billion. 57  As pertinently argued by a recent study published by the 
European Parliament assessing the impact of these Commission proposals, 58  these 
estimations are still not financially sound and the actual “financial and administrative impact 
may be far greater than the Commission envisages”, as these not include “the administrative costs 
incurred by Member States in the running of the EES, and the costs of processing RTP applications in 
consular posts abroad, particular those that are unused to dealing with a large volume of requests.” 
According to Frontex, 344,928 third country nationals were treated as not fulfilling or no 
longer fulfilling their conditions of entry into the EU in 2012.59 The top five nationalities of 
those treated as ‘overstayers’ were Afghans, Moroccans, Pakistanis, Algerians and Tunisians. 
They accounted for over ¼ of all persons so treated. 115,305 people were refused entry at the 
EU’s external borders. The five top nationalities, accounting for almost 50% of all refusals 
were (in order of numerical importance) Ukrainians, Albanians, Russians, Georgians and 
Serbians. All of them are nationals of countries neighbouring the EU and two – Albanian and 
Serbian nationals - are not required to obtain visas to enter the EU (provided they have new 
style biometric passports). In light of Frontex’s information, it is not clear how either an EES 
or a RTP would substantially change the situation. 
Turning to the reasons why third country nationals are refused entry to the EU, the five main 
reasons (leaving aside the category ‘other’), according to FRONTEX are: 
 No valid visa (or residence permit – accounting for 35,451 refusals; 
 No justification for the visit – accounting for 25,306 refusals; 
 Entry on the Schengen Information System60 as a person to be refused admission to 
the EU – accounting for 15,691 refusals; 
 No or inadequate means of subsistence – accounting for 11,015 refusals; and 
 No valid travel document – accounting for 7,538 refusals. 
All of the main grounds for refusal except the SIS entry, depend on traditional border 
control techniques- checking passports, visas and the reason for admission. Interestingly, 
also according to the same data provided by Frontex, only 3,270 persons were refused 
admission to the EU on the basis that they were or were likely to be a security threat. The 
grounds for this refusal are public policy (which is usually related to criminality), internal 
security, public health or the international relations of a Member State. Most surprising of all 
is how banal the process is – the numbers are low given the size of the EU and the probable 
volumes of people entering and leaving the EU; the reasons for the most part are mechanical, 
not the right documents, not enough money or speculative on the part of the border guard: 
not the right reason to want to enter to the EU. The statistical evidence does not lead to an 
                                                   
56 COM(2013)95. 
57 Unisys (2010) Final Report Cost Analysis of Entry-Exit & Registered Traveller Systems. Brussels, CB-E-SO30-REP-
003 (http://tinyurl.com/n9l5uck).  
58 J. Jeandesboz, D. Bigo, B. Hayes and S. Simon (2013), The Commission’s Legislative Proposals on Smart Borders: 
Their Feasibility and Costs, European Parliament, DG IPOL, Brussels, pages 42-50. 
59 FRONTEX Annual Risk Analysis 2013. 
60  Brouwer, Evelien. Digital borders and real rights: effective remedies for third-country nationals in the Schengen 
information system. Vol. 15. BRILL, 2008. 
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obvious and overwhelming need for overhaul, technological development or massive 
budgetary expenditure.  
The last new technology which the EU is rolling out as part of its external border controls 
agenda is the above-mentioned EUROSUR. As previously anticipated, this technology 
consists of a mix of satellite imaging and drones watching the EU’s external borders with 
the objective of reducing the loss of lives at sea and the number of irregular immigrants 
entering the EU undetected, and to increase internal security by preventing cross-border 
crimes, such as trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of drugs.61 For the system to 
work, cooperation with neighbouring third countries is essential according to the 
Commission’s Communication. According to the European Commission’s Press Release, the 
exchange of information in the framework of EUROSUR will take the form of 'situational 
pictures', which can be described as graphical interfaces presenting data, information and 
intelligence. Moreover, “These situational pictures will be established at national and European 
level and will be structured in a similar way to facilitate the flow of information among them. In order 
to improve the capability of detecting small vessels, Frontex will also set up a service for the common 
application of surveillance tools, combining, among other things, satellite imagery with information 
derived from ship reporting systems.”62  
According to Frontex, EUROSUR has three phases, the first is the rationalization of 
surveillance systems among the Schengen states, the second is “to improve surveillance at the 
EU level by introducing more advanced technologies and combining all the resultant data to form a 
coherent whole, available to its users 24 hours a day, seven days a week;” and the third involves 
creating a common information sharing ‘environment’ for all Member State agencies 
affected. The cost estimates for EUROSUR amount to €338 million for 2011-2020, according 
to the Commission.63 This is indeed an expensive system and one which uses technologies 
which are more commonly associated with military equipment than civilian ones. There is 
always the argument and a very valid one too, that even one unnecessary death in the 
Mediterranean is beyond cost. But the question which arises is whether this enormously 
ambitious system will actually assist if the problem is a more mundane one. According to 
the Guardian Weekly 11-17 October 2013, in August 2013 the Italian authorities ordered two 
commercial ships to rescue a migrant boat and then demanded that captains transport the 
migrants back to Libya (where none of them wanted to go and indeed from where they were 
in flight). One can well imagine the dilemma of the captains faced with a boat load of 
desperate people terrified of being returned to Libya. Better satellite surveillance or drones 
will not resolve this ethical issue. 
5. Conclusions 
The debates about EU border controls in the second half of 2013 have been fierce. The 
continuing loss of life in the Mediterranean because of the failure to rescue people seeking to 
reach the EU’s southern borders has fuelled much anguish on the subject. While there is a 
general consensus that something needs to be done to diminish the loss of life, there are very 
different approaches to what that something must be. UNHCR has called for better reception 
facilities within the EU; the Pope has called for humanity for those seeking a better life; the 
Commission has called for more responsible policing of North African borders which would 
prevent people leaving in small boats. The backdrop to the debates is ‘what kind’ of border 
controls should the EU have.  
                                                   
61 COM(2011)873. 
62 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-11-1528_en.htm?locale=FR. 
63 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-11-896_en.htm?locale=FR. 
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There are two main frameworks around the border control issue in the EU. The first is the 
traditional approach – passports, visas and checks carried out by border guards at the external 
frontiers. The second is the greater use of technology in the form of databases with biometric 
identifiers and electronic automated checks at external frontiers and satellite images for 
border guards so that they can see who is approaching the borders, land or sea.  
This Essay has examined the claims regarding border controls from the perspective of 
available knowledge and statistical information about what happens at EU borders on the 
basis of the statistical information which the EU’s border agency, Frontex makes available. 
What is particularly noticeable from the statistical information is the unclear articulation 
between the facts of EU border controls on persons and the claims and proposals for new 
technologies which emerge from EU institutions.  
The dilemma is one of scale – the numbers of third country nationals entering the EU per 
year (probably in the region of about 90 million), the population of the EU (about 508 
million) are in one order of things. The numbers of persons drowning in the Mediterranean 
(about 1,500 in 2011), the numbers of persons refused admission to the EU (just over 115,000 
in 2012) and even the numbers of persons treated as not fulfilling or no longer fulfilling their 
entry conditions to the EU (under 350,000 in 2012) let alone those using false or fraudulent 
documents (under 8,000 in 2012) are of a completely different order.  
In view of the tremendous disjunction between the two scales, the measures adopted that 
have a massive impact on the totality of people moving (such as large new databases with 
biometric information and entry-exit schemes for tracking everyone’s movements, satellite 
images and drones) simply in order to deal with issues involving 0.08% of that total are 
quite simply disproportionate. People need to be rescued in the Mediterranean – but the 
best way to do this is to encourage rather than discourage all those fishing boats, pleasure 
boats and other vessels travelling the Mediterranean to rescue people. Massive collection 
storage, use and transmission of sensitive personal data, including fingerprints, of people 
travelling, or displacing this responsibility to third North African countries, is a very 
unsatisfactory and odd response to the dilemmas raised by human mobility in EU’s external 
borders. 
Where are the solutions to the current problems? The first is to be found in reducing the 
obstacles to mobility of people in the Mediterranean. Unnecessary visa requirements are 
clearly an important part of the problem. Secondly, the EU institutions need to ensure that in 
the transposition of EU anti-smuggling and trafficking legislation, Member States do not 
create obstacles to search and rescue at sea in the private sector. The private sector is central, 
through the wide network of commercial sea activities in the Mediterranean, to saving 
people quickly and effectively, so long as they are not intentionally or unintentionally 
discouraged from doing so. Indeed, it is an obligation of the international law of the sea to 
rescue people at risk of drowning at sea. 
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